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Abstract
The undisciplined use of shared mutable state can be a source of program errors when aliases
unsafely interfere with each other. While protocol-based techniques to reason about interference
abound, they do not address two practical concerns: the decidability of protocol composition and
its integration with protocol abstraction. We show that our composition procedure is decidable
and that it ensures safe interference even when composing abstract protocols. To evaluate the
expressiveness of our protocol framework for safe shared memory interference, we show how this
same protocol framework can be used to model safe, typeful message-passing concurrency idioms.
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1 Introduction
The interactions that can occur via shared mutable state can be a source of program errors.
When different clients access the same mutable state, their actions can potentially interfere.
For instance, the programmer may wrongly assume that a cell holds a particular type, when
another part of the program has changed that cell to hold a different type. When this
happens, the program may fault due to unsafe interference caused by unexpected actions
through other aliases to that shared state. Thus, to reason about interference we must reason
about how state is aliased and how the different aliases use the shared state.
Our technique builds on the use of linear capabilities [1] to track type-changing resource
mutation within the framework of a linear type system. However, relying solely on linearity
is often too restrictive. For instance, linearity enforces exclusive ownership of mutable
state, which is incompatible with multithreading—i.e. linearity forbids sharing. To allow
sharing, we extend the concept of rely-guarantee protocols [19]. By sequencing steps of
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“rely⇒guarantee” actions, each protocol characterizes an alias’s local, isolated perspective on
interactions with a piece of shared state:
“what I assume about the state”⇒ “what I guarantee about the state”︸ ︷︷ ︸
current step
; next step
Since the interactions performed by an alias may change over time, a rely-guarantee protocol
is formed by a sequence of steps that specify each interfering action. Each step relies on
the shared state having some type and then, after some private actions, guarantees that
the shared state will now have some other type, which becomes visible to other aliases.
By constraining the actions of each alias, we can make strong assumptions about the kind
of interference that an alias may produce, in the spirit of rely-guarantee reasoning [13].
Naturally, not all protocols compose safely. While a protocol describes its own actions on
a piece of shared state, protocol composition will ensure that those actions are safe w.r.t.
the actions that can be done via other existing (and even future) protocols over that state.
Composition is safe only if the set of protocols accounts for all possible run-time action
interleavings that may occur on that shared state.
Our main contribution is a decidable protocol composition procedure that also allows
abstract protocols to be composed. We break down our contributions as follows:
We adapt the existing constructs of rely-guarantee protocols [19] to work in a system
with concurrent run-time semantics, and show that rely-guarantee protocols are useful to
reason about safe interference in the concurrent setting.
We give an axiomatic definition of protocol composition. We show that this procedure
can be implemented in a sound and complete (w.r.t. the formal definition) algorithm
that terminates on all legal inputs.1 This algorithm is implemented in a prototype.2
We show that our use of type abstraction and bounded quantification at the protocol
level enables us to model new, and more general, polymorphic forms of safe modular
shared state interactions.
We prove our system sound through progress and preservation theorems that show the
absence of unsafe interference in correctly typed programs. Our design ensures memory
safety and data-race freedom, where linear resources are shared via protocol composition
(a partial commutative monoid [16, 6]).
We evaluate the expressiveness of our system by discussing how our core shared memory
protocol framework is capable of expressing safe, typeful message-passing idioms.
Next, we briefly introduce the language that “hosts” our protocols, with the remaining
text focused on discussing new protocol-level features. Sections 2 and 3 introduce our
novel definition of protocol composition and its extensions to support abstract protocols.
Section 4 discusses technical results; followed by discussions of expressiveness, related work,
and conclusions.
1.1 Preliminaries: Language Overview
Our language supports fork/join concurrency combined with lock-based mutual exclusion,
where all threads share a common heap. We use the variant of the polymorphic λ-calculus
1 We have not proven the decidability of the entire type system, but only of the protocol composition
algorithm which is at its core. The remainder of the type system is more conventional and we did not
encounter difficulties with decidability when implementing similar rules in our prior work [19].
2 See: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~foliveir/protocol-composition.html
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x ∈ Variables t ∈ Tags f ∈ Fields ρ ∈ Location Constants
e ::= v (value)
| v.f (field selection)
| v v (application)
| let x = e in e end (let)
| new v (cell creation)
| delete v (cell deletion)
| !v (dereference)
| v := v (assign)
| case v of t#x→ e end (case)
| lock v (lock locations)
| unlock v (unlock locations)
| fork e (spawn thread)
v ::= ρ (address)
| x (variable)
| λx.e (function)
| {f = v} (record)
| t#v (tagged value)
Notes: Z is a potentially empty sequence of Z elements. ρ is not source-level.
Figure 1 Grammar — Values (v) and expressions (e).
shown in Figure 1. For convenience, the grammar is let-expanded so that all constructs,
except let, are defined over values. The language includes first-class functions (λ), records
({f = v}) that label a value as f, and tagged values (t#v) to mark a value with a tag.
Standard constructs are used for field selection, application, let blocks, memory allocation,
deletion, assignment, dereference, and case analysis. “lock v” atomically locks a non-empty set
of locations (ensuring both mutual exclusion and forbidding re-entrant uses) and analogously
with “unlock v”. “fork e” executes the expression in a new thread while sharing access to
the common global heap. The operational semantics are standard and, as such, are only
shown in the companion Technical Report [21]. They produce the standard evaluation of the
language’s constructs such as creating or deleting memory, spawning new threads, etc.
We type mutable references by following the design proposed in L3 [1]. Therefore, a
mutable cell is decomposed into two components: a pure reference, which can be freely
copied; and a linear [10] capability, a resource that is used to track the contents of that cell.
To link a reference to its respective capability, we use location-dependent types. For instance,
a new cell has type ∃l.( (!ref l) :: (rw l A) ). This type abstracts the fresh location, l, that
was created by the memory allocation. Furthermore, we are given a reference of type “!ref l”
to mean a pure/duplicable (!) reference to a location l, where the information about the
contents of that location is stored in the linear capability for l. The permission to access
(e.g. dereference) the contents of a cell requires both the reference and the capability to be
available. Our capabilities follow the format “rw l A”, meaning a read-write capability to
a location l that currently has contents of type A (the type of the value, given in “new v”,
that initializes the new cell). We depart from [1] by making capabilities typing artifacts that
only exist at the level of typing. Consequently, capabilities are managed implicitly by the
type system rather than manually manipulated by the programmer via language constructs.
However, we may still need to associate a capability with another type. For this reason, we
use the notion of stacking [20]. In ∃l.( (!ref l) :: (rw l A) ) we see that the capability to l
is stacked on top of “!ref l” since the capability is to the right of the “::”. This allows the
capability to be bundled together with the ref type, but no action is required to unbundle
them if they are needed separately. We refer to prior work [16, 20, 19, 1] for more details on
the use of capabilities, locations, and stacking, as well as convenient abbreviations. Here, it
suffices to assume that they are handled automatically by the type system, as our focus here
is on safely sharing the linear resources.
In the scheme above, all the variables that reference the same location also share a single
linear (i.e. “exclusively owned” or “unique”) capability that tracks the changes to that
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// assume ‘y’ in scope y : !ref l, rw l int
y := "ok!"; y : !ref l, rw l string
let x = y in x : !ref l, y : !ref l, rw l string
x := false; x : !ref l, y : !ref l, rw l boolean
delete x; x : !ref l, y : !ref l
!y // Type Error: missing capability to location ‘l’.
Figure 2 Tracking linear capabilities.
X ∈ Type Variables l ∈ Location Variables
p ::= ρ | l u ::= l | X U ::= p | A
A ::= !A (pure/persistent)
| A( A (linear function)
| [f : A] (record)
| ∑
i
ti#Ai (tagged sum)
| ∀l.A (universal location)
| ∃l.A (existential location)
| ∀X<:A.A (bounded universal type)
| ∃X<:A.A (bounded existential type)
| ref p (reference type)
| X[U ] (type variable)
| (rec X(u).A)[U ] (recursive type)
| A⊕A (alternative)
| A & A (intersection)
| rw p A (capability to p)
| none (empty resource)
| top (top)
| A :: A (stacking)
| A ∗A (separation)
| A⇒ A (rely)
| A ; A (guarantee)
Notes: we simplify X[] to X; ⊕, &, ∗, + are commutative and associative.
Figure 3 Grammar — Types (A) (Continued from Figure 1.).
location’s contents (as shown in Figure 2). However, this tracking relies on a compile-time
approximation of how variables alias, which constrains how state can be used. Since the
linear capability must be (linearly) threaded through the program, this scheme forbids
aliasing idioms that require “simultaneous” access to aliased state, such as when multiple
threads share access to a cell. To enable this form of sharing, we split a linear resource
into multiple protocols. Each protocol controls how an alias interacts with the shared state,
without depending on precise knowledge of which variables alias each other. We will continue
with a brief presentation of the base language, before diving into the details of our sharing
mechanism in Section 2.
(Note that rely and guarantee types will only be discussed in the next section, when
we present sharing). Our types (Figure 3) follow the connectives of linear logic [10]. For
this reason a function type uses ( (instead of →) to denote a linear function. The linear
restriction can be lifted when the type is preceded by a “bang”, such as in !A, which denotes
a pure/duplicable type. Records are typed as [f : A] where each field f types the value of the
record with some type A.
∑
i ti#Ai denotes a single tagged type or a sequence of tagged
types separated by + (such as “a#A + b#B + c#C”). We have separate existential and
universal quantification over locations and types, since locations and types are of different
kinds. Note that we leave ∀/∃ as typing artifacts and as such they do not have corresponding
constructs in the language. Quantification over types can provide a type bound (on the right
of <:) and where top is assumed by default when the bound is omitted.
Our recursive types (assumed to be non-bottom types) are equi-recursive, interpreted
co-inductively, and satisfy the usual folding/unfolding principle:
(rec X(u).A)[U ] = A{(rec X(u).A)/X}{U/u} (eq:Rec)
Recursive types may include a list of type/location parameters (u) that are substituted by
some type/location (U) on unfold, besides unfolding the recursive type variable (X).
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Γ | ∆0 ` e : A a ∆1 Typing rules, (t:*)
(t:Pure)
Γ | · ` v : A a ·
Γ | · ` v : !A a ·
(t:Pure-Elim)
Γ, x : A0 | ∆0 ` e : A1 a ∆1
Γ | ∆0, x : !A0 ` e : A1 a ∆1
(t:Frame)
Γ | ∆0 ` e : A a ∆1
Γ | ∆0,∆2 ` e : A a ∆1,∆2
(t:Function)
Γ | ∆, x : A0 ` e : A1 a ·
Γ | ∆ ` λx.e : A0 ( A1 a ·
(t:Application)
Γ | ∆0 ` v0 : A0 ( A1 a ∆1 Γ | ∆1 ` v1 : A0 a ∆2
Γ | ∆0 ` v0 v1 : A1 a ∆2
(t:New)
Γ | ∆0 ` v : A a ∆1
Γ | ∆0 ` new v : ∃l.((!ref l) :: (rw l A)) a ∆1
(t:Delete)
Γ | ∆0 ` v : ∃l.((!ref l) :: (rw l A)) a ∆1
Γ | ∆0 ` delete v : ∃l.A a ∆1
(t:Assign)
Γ | ∆0 ` v1 : A0 a ∆1
Γ | ∆1 ` v0 : ref p a ∆2, rw p A1
Γ | ∆0 ` v0 := v1 : A1 a ∆2, rw p A0
(t:Let)
Γ | ∆0 ` e0 : A0 a ∆1
Γ | ∆1, x : A0 ` e1 : A1 a ∆2
Γ | ∆0 ` let x = e0 in e1 end : A1 a ∆2
(t:Dereference-Linear)
Γ | ∆0 ` v : ref p a ∆1, rw p A
Γ | ∆0 ` !v : A a ∆1, rw p ![]
(t:LocOpenBind)
Γ, l : loc | ∆0, x : A1 ` e : A2 a ∆1
Γ | ∆0, x : ∃l.A1 ` e : A2 a ∆1
(t:Subsumption)
Γ ` ∆0 <: ∆1 Γ | ∆1 ` e : A0 a ∆2 Γ ` A0 <: A1 Γ ` ∆2 <: ∆3
Γ | ∆0 ` e : A1 a ∆3
Note: bounded variables of a construct and of quantifiers must be fresh in the rule’s conclusion.
Figure 4 Typing rules (selected, see [21] for complete set).
We use ⊕ to denote a union of alternative types, and & to denote a linear choice of different
types. none is the empty resource. Finally we have “A0 :: A1” for stacking resource A1 on
top of A0. Stacking is not commutative, so that it is not guaranteed that “A0 :: A1 :: A2” can
be used in place of “A0 :: A2 :: A1”. To enable resource commutation, we use the ∗ operator
such that “A0 :: (A1 ∗ A2)” and “A0 :: (A2 ∗ A1)” are interchangeable via subtyping. For
clarity, we will review these type annotations as we present examples further below. Note
that we do not syntactically distinguish resources (such as capabilities or protocols) from
value-inhabited types. However, the type system ensures that types such as none can never
be used to type a value. Indeed, even though “wrong” types can be assumed (such as in a
function’s argument) they can never actually be introduced as values.
To enable automatic threading of resources, we use a type-and-effect system with judg-
ments of the form: Γ | ∆0 ` e : A a ∆1 stating that with lexical environment Γ and linear
resources ∆0 we assign the expression e the type A, with effects resulting in the resources in
∆1. The typing environments are defined as follows:
Γ ::= · (empty)
| Γ, x : A (variable binding)
| Γ, p : loc (location assertion)
| Γ, X<:A (bound assertion)
| Γ, X : k (kind assertion)
∆ ::= · (empty)
| ∆, x : A (linear binding)
| ∆, A (linear resource)
k ::= type | type→ k | loc→ k (kinds)
Recursive type variables are given an→ kind, where the left hand side tracks the type/location
kind of a parameter of that recursive type.
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Figure 4 includes a few selected typing rules. Additional rules are shown below as they
become relevant to the discussion on sharing, with the remainder left to the T.R.. (t:Pure)
types a value as pure if the value does not use any resources. If a variable is of a pure
type, then (t:PureElim) allows the binding to be moved to the linear context with its
type explicitly “banged” with !. (t:Frame) enables framing [27] resources that are not used
by an expression, just threaded through the expression. Since a function, (t:Function),
can depend on the resources inside of ∆ (which the function captures), a functional value
must be linear. However, the function can later be rendered pure (!) through the use of
(t:Pure) if the set of resources it captures is actually empty. (t:Application) is the
standard rule. As discussed above, (t:New) and (t:Delete) manipulate types that abstract
the underlying location that was created or that is to be deleted. (t:Assign) updates
the contents of a location with the type of the newly assigned value. (t:Let) threads the
effects of e0 to the initial linear resources of e1, sequencing the evaluation of the expressions
as usual. (t:Dereference-Linear) removes the contents of a cell, leaving the residual
“unit” type behind (the semantics leave the cell unchanged but unusable through typing).
(t:LocOpenBind) enables non-syntax-directed opening of existential location packages.
The subtyping rules are deferred to the T.R., but it suffices to know the subtyping
judgment, Γ ` A0 <: A1, which states that A0 is a subtype of A1, meaning that A0 can be
used anywhere A1 is expected. An analogous judgment governs subtyping between linear
environments, Γ ` ∆0 <: ∆1. Thus, the (t:Subsumption) rule simply states that we can
type an expression while using weaker assumptions and ensuring a stronger result and effect,
as these types cannot break the conclusion’s type expectations.
2 A Protocol for Modeling Fork-Join Interactions
We begin by describing how non-abstracted protocols compose and how rely-guarantee proto-
cols work in the concurrent setting. Our language supports the fork/join model of concurrency,
in which a join is encoded via shared state interactions. There are two participants in this
interaction: the Main thread and the Forked thread. The forked thread computes some result.
When the main thread joins the forked thread it will wait until the result becomes available,
if it is not yet ready. Our primitives to interact with shared state are reading/writing and
locking/unlocking. Because of this, our protocols must explicitly model the “wait for result”
cycle of a join.3 A thread scheduler could reduce or eliminate the spinning caused by this
“busy-wait”, but this is beyond the scope of our discussion. We define the two protocols as:
F , Wait⇒ Result ; none M , (Wait⇒Wait ; M ) ⊕ (Result⇒ Done ; Done )
Each protocol contains a sequence of steps that control the use of locks and specify the
(type) assumptions on that locked state. Since locks hide all private actions, the protocols
will only need to model the changes that become visible upon unlocking. These changes are
bounded by a single lock-unlock block, which is mapped to a single rely⇒guarantee step in
the protocol. When we lock a cell we will assume that the state is of some type and, when we
eventually unlock that cell, we will guarantee that it changed to some other type. Multiple
steps can be sequenced using the ; operator.
The forked thread will be given the F protocol. This protocol initially assumes that
the shared state is of type Wait on locking. In order to legally unlock that cell, we must
3 Each protocol must be aware of all valid states, as an omission would leave room for unsafe interference,
such as when later re-splitting that protocol.
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first fulfill the obligation to mutate the state to Result. Once that guarantee is obeyed the
protocol continues as none. This empty resource type models termination since the forked
thread will never be able to access that shared state again. Note that since subsequent steps
may be influenced by the guarantee of the current step, a protocol step is to be interpreted
as “Wait ⇒ (Result ; none )”.
The Main protocol includes two alternative (⊕) steps that describe different uses of the
shared state. If we find the shared cell containing the Wait type then the main thread must
leave the state with the same type, before later retrying M. Otherwise, if we find the cell
containing a Result, we know that F has already terminated and can no longer access the
shared state. In that situation, we mutate the cell to Done and unlock it so that each lock
always has a matching unlock. Afterwards, the protocol continues as Done, a type that is
just a regular linear capability. Thus, M recovered ownership of the shared state and Done
can continue to be used without locking since the cell is no longer shared. We can now give
concrete definitions for Wait, Result, and Done as types describing a single capability to
location l as follows:
Wait , rw l Wait#![] Result , rw l Result#int Done , rw l ![]
Wait is a capability to location l containing a tagged value, where Wait is the tag and “![]” (a
pure empty record) is the type of the value. Result is a capability for l containing an integer
value tagged with Result. The two tags will enable us to distinguish between the Wait and
Result alternatives by using standard case analysis. With Done the content is an empty pure
record (“unit”).
Each protocol describes an alias’s local, isolated view of the evolution of the shared
state. Thus, we can discuss the uses of each protocol independently. Because a protocol is
a linear resource, the forked thread will “consume” or “capture” F in its context, making
it unavailable to the main thread. As with any linear resource, F is tracked by the linear
typing environment (∆) and is either used by an expression or threaded through to the next
expression. However, the forked thread and main thread can share the enclosing lexical
typing environment (Γ) because it only contains pure/duplicable assumptions. A possible
use of the F protocol follows.
3 fork Γ = c : ref l, l : loc | ∆ = work : ![]( int, F
4 let r = work {} in Γ = r : int, ... | ∆ = Wait⇒ (Result ; none)
5 lock c; Γ = ... | ∆ = Wait, (Result ; none)
6 c := Result#r; Γ = ... | ∆ = Result, (Result ; none)
7 unlock c Γ = ... | ∆ = none
8 end Γ = ... | ∆ = ·
Γ contains a reference (c) to the location (l) that is being shared by the protocol, and
∆ contains a variable with the (linear) function that computes the work that the thread
will do. (In this example both protocols refer to a well-known common location, but our
technique also allows each protocol to ∃ abstract its locations.) Line 4 consumes the function
work by calling it and storing the result in variable r. At this point we want to update
the shared state to signal that the result is ready. Since we are accessing shared state in a
multi-threaded environment we first lock the shared location that is being referenced by c.
To type a lock we must map the locations listed in the lock to those contained in the rely
type of the protocol. Well-formedness conditions on the protocols ensure that, at each step,
the rely and the guarantee types refer the same set of locations so that no lock on a location
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goes without a respective unlock (later on).
Γ | · ` v : ref p a · locs(A0) = p
Γ | ∆, A0 ⇒ A1 ` lock v : ![] a ∆, A0, A1
(t:Lock-Rely)
When locking (line 5), the step of F is broken down into its two components: the rely type
(Wait) and the guarantee type (Result;none). While Wait describes the linear resources that
are now available to use, the guarantee type is an obligation to mutate the state to fulfill
the given type before unlocking. Indeed, line 7 is only valid because the shared state was
modified to match the promised guarantee type (Result).
Γ | · ` v : ref p a · locs(A0) = p
Γ | ∆, A0, (A0;A1) ` unlock v : ![] a ∆, A1
(t:Unlock-Guarantee)
(with parenthesis used for clarity). Once the guarantee is fulfilled, we can move on to the next
step of the protocol (in the case of F, none; or A1, in the case of the rule above). The none
type is the empty resource that can be automatically discarded, leaving ∆ empty (·). Thus,
the uses of protocols are mapped to the (t:Lock-Rely) and (t:Unlock-Guarantee)
rules that step a protocol. We now show the rest of the encoding:
1 let newFork = λwork. Γ = · | ∆ = work : ![]( int
2 let c = new Wait#{} in Γ = c : ref l, l : loc | ∆ = rw l Wait#![], ...
3 fork ... // lines 3 to 8 shown above. Γ = ... | ∆ = M, F, ...
To simplify the presentation, our term language is stripped of type annotations. However,
the newFork function has type !( ( ![]( int )( ( ![]( int ) ) where the argument of this
pure function is the work to be done by the thread, as was shown above. The resulting
function is the join (shown below) that, once called, waits for the forked thread’s result.
Line 2 creates the cell that will be shared by the main and forked threads. This new cell,
although typed ∃l.( (!ref l) :: (rw l Wait#![]) ), is automatically opened by the type system
via (t:LocOpenBind) to allow direct access to the ref l reference via variable c.
Line 3 shares the cell by splitting the capability to location l into the M and F protocols.
This split is done in a non-syntax-directed way through (t:Subsumption) (of Figure 4),
combined with the following rule for subtyping on ∆’s:
Γ ` ∆0 <: ∆1 Γ ` A0 V A1 || A2
Γ ` ∆0, A0 <: ∆1, A1, A2
(sd:Share)
Where the following resource split (V) is used:
Γ ` Wait V M || F (recall: Wait , rw l Wait#![])
This split results in the capability to location l being replaced by the two protocols, M and F,
in ∆. The composition check (described in the next subsection) relies on the knowledge that M
and F share the same location. Once the protocols are known to compose safely, however, we
no longer need to track this sharing—each protocol can abstract the location being accessed
under a different name, and they can be used independently. The fork expression is typed by
consuming the resources that the fork will use (such as F in the fork of line 3):
Γ | ∆ ` e : ![] a ·
Γ | ∆ ` fork e : ![] a · (t:Fork)
This rule is somewhat similar to (t:Function), but the result type is unit because fork does
not produce a result. Thus, a fork is executed for the effects it produces on the shared state.
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As such, to avoid leaking resources, the final residual resources of the forked expression must
be empty and the resulting value pure (note that “!A <: ![]”).
Finally, we show the join function that will “busy-wait” for the forked thread to produce
a result. Its use of both recursion and case analysis should be straightforward as they follow
standard usage. The following text will focus on the less obvious details.
9 λ_.rec R. ∆ = (Wait⇒ (Wait; M) ) ⊕ (Result⇒ (Done;Done) )
10 [a]∆ = Wait⇒ (Wait; M) [b]∆ = Result⇒ (Done;Done)
11 lock c; [a]∆ = Wait, (Wait; M) [b]∆ = Result, (Done;Done)
12 case !c of [a]∆ = rw l ![], (Wait; M) [b]∆ = rw l ![], (Done;Done)
13 Wait#x → // must restore linear value [a]∆ = rw l ![], (Wait; M)
14 c := Wait#x; [a]∆ = Wait, (Wait; M)
15 unlock c; [a]∆ = M
16 R // retries
17 | Result#x → [b]Γ = x : int, . . . | ∆ = rw l ![], (Done;Done)
18 unlock c; [b]Γ = x : int, . . . | ∆ = rw l ![]
19 delete c; [b]Γ = x : int, . . . | ∆ = ·
20 x
21 end
22 end
We omit Γ to center the discussion on the contents of ∆. The alternative type (⊕) lists
a union of types that may be valid at that point in the program. To use such a type, an
expression must consider each alternative individually via (t:Alternative-Left):
Γ | ∆0, A0 ` e : A2 a ∆1 Γ | ∆0, A1 ` e : A2 a ∆1
Γ | ∆0, A0 ⊕A1 ` e : A2 a ∆1
(t:Alternative-Left)
The breakdown of ⊕ (line 10) is done automatically by the type system. Thus, the body
of the recursion must be typed individually under each one of those alternatives, marked as
[a] and [b]. The type of the resource on each alternative contains a sum type that matches
different branches in the case of line 12. Note that it is safe for this sum type to only match
a subset of the branches that the case lists. The remaining branches are simply ignored when
typing the case with that sum type:
Γ | ∆0 ` v :
∑
i
ti#Ai a ∆1 Γ | ∆1, xi : Ai ` ei : A a ∆2 i ≤ j
Γ | ∆0 ` case v of tj#xj → ej end : A a ∆2
(t:Case)
This enables the same case to produce different effects, such as obeying incompatible
guarantees, based solely on the tagged contents of v. For instance, the Result branch will
recover ownership and destroy the shared cell (line 19), while the Wait branch must restore
the linear value of that cell (that was removed by the linear dereference of line 12, that left
“rw l ![]” in ∆) before retrying. Although line 19 deletes the cell, we first unlock the cell to
fulfill the “Done;Done” guarantee of the final protocol step.
A rely-guarantee protocol is a specification of each lock-unlock usage, modeled by a
protocol type. Therefore, we will continue the discussion on interference by only looking at
the protocols, while omitting the actual concrete programs that use them.
2.1 Checking Safe Protocol Composition
We now introduce our main contribution: a novel axiomatic definition of protocol composition,
which is later extended to support abstraction. Composing protocols over some shared state
requires considering all possible ways in which the use of these protocols may be interleaved.
Thus, regardless of the non-deterministic way by which aliases are interleaved at run-time, a
correct composition will ensure that all possible uses are safe.
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Intuitively, a binary protocol split will generate an infinite binary tree representing all
combinations of interleaved uses of the two new protocols. Each node of that tree has two
children based on which protocol remains stationary while the other is stepped. Since this
tree may be infinite, we must build a co-inductive proof of safe interference. We only consider
binary splits when checking composition but since a protocol can be later re-split, there is
no limit to how many protocols may share some state.
The two protocols, M and F, shown above contain a finite number of different positions.
We call a configuration the combination of the positions of each protocol and the current
type of the shared resources. Each configuration is of the form:
〈 Γ ` ResourcesV Protocol || Protocol 〉
Thus, when we split a Wait cell into protocols M4 and F5, we get the following set of
configurations that simulate the uses done via the protocols (seen as atomic public transitions
of lock-unlock uses, corresponding to the respective rely and guarantee types):
{ Ê 〈 Γ `WaitV M || F 〉 , Ë 〈 Γ ` ResultV M || none 〉 ,
Ì 〈 Γ ` DoneV Done || none 〉 , Í 〈 Γ ` noneV none || none 〉 }
Configuration Ê represents the initial split of Wait into M and F. Starting from some
configuration, we will leave one of the protocols stationary while we simulate a use of the
shared state (a step) with the remaining protocol. From Ê if we step M we will stay in the
same configuration. If instead F is stepped, we get to configuration Ë that changed the
state to Result and terminates the F protocol. By continuing to step M we have the two last
configurations: Ì where the last step of M is ready to recover ownership, and Í where the
ownership of the shared resource was recovered and all protocols have terminated (i.e. all
resources are empty, none).
Upon sharing, the ownership of the shared resources belongs to all intervening protocols;
all protocols can access the shared resources through locking. Ownership recovery means that
this ownership is given back to one single protocol and “revoked” from all remaining protocols.
In our protocols, recovery is modeled via protocol termination, such that a step transitions
to a state rather than to another protocol step. However, to be safe, we must be sure that
this permanent ownership transfer only occurs on the last protocol to terminate, ensuring
that no other protocol may accidentally assume that that shared state is still available. The
ownership recovery in Ì transfers Done from the “pool” of shared resources to the alias that
uses the last step of the M protocol. We also see by Í that this stepping consumes both the
shared resource (leaving it as none) and the final “step” of M (leaving the protocol position
also as none).
All protocol configurations shown above can take a step. (Even none can take a vacuous
step that remains in the same configuration since none cannot change the shared resources.)
Therefore, each protocol will always find an expected state in the shared cell regardless of how
protocols are interleaved—i.e. all interference is safe since no configuration is stuck. A stuck
configuration occurs when at least one of the protocols cannot take a step with the current
type of the shared resources. For instance, 〈Γ ` ResultV M || F〉 cannot take a step with F
since F does not rely on Result in any of its available steps. If such stuck configurations were
allowed to occur, then a program could fault due to unexpected values stored in shared cells
4 M , ( Wait⇒ ( Wait ; M ) ) ⊕ ( Result⇒ ( Done ; Done ) )
5 F , Wait⇒ ( Result ; none )
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P,Q ::= (rec X(u).P )[UP ] | X[UP ] | P ⊕ P | P & P | none
| S ⇒ P | S ; P | ∃l.P | ∀l.P | ∃X <: A.P | ∀X <: A.P
S ::= (rec X(u).S)[US ] | X[US ] | S ⊕ S | S & S | none | A ∗A | rw p A
R ::= P | S
Note: that the structure of allowed protocols is further restricted via protocol composition, beyond the
syntactical categories above. Namely, abstraction is only enabled by the rules of Section 3.3.
Figure 5 Grammar for checking safe protocol composition: P rotocols, States, and Resources.
or due to attempts to access cells that were destroyed using wrong assumptions of ownership
recovery.
Protocol composition ensures that a resource, R (capabilities or protocols), can be shared
(split) as two protocols, P and Q, noted: Γ ` RV P || Q. Figure 5 lists the grammatical
categories (for protocols, states and resources) that we consider when composing protocols.
As exemplified above we use a set of configurations, C, to represent the positions of each
protocol as we traverse all possible interleaved uses of the two new protocols. C is defined as:
C ::= C · C (union) | 〈 Γ ` RV P || Q 〉 (configuration)
Protocol composition, applied via (sd:Share), ensures that all configurations reachable
through stepping are themselves able to take a step, as follows:
〈 Γ ` RV P || Q 〉↑
Γ ` RV P || Q (wf:Split)
C0 7→ C1 C1 ↑
C0 ↑
================= (wf:Configuration)
Where C ↑ signals the divergence of stepping, consistent with the co-inductive nature of
protocol composition. We use a double line, as in (wf:Configuration), to mean that a
rule is to be interpreted co-inductively. This definition accounts for protocols that never
terminate and also ensures that all protocols can take a step with a given resource.
We now discuss the basic protocol composition definition of Figure 6. (c:AllStep)
synchronously steps all existing configurations, where each configuration is stepped through
(c:Step). We use R∗ (where ∗ is either L or R) to specify the configuration reduction context
on one of the protocols of a configuration, while the remaining one remains stationary, i.e.:
RL[] =  || Q (for the Left protocol, Q is stationary)
RR[] = P ||  (for the Right protocol, P is stationary)
The subsequent stepping rules use R to range over both RL and RR.
We use three distinct label prefixes to group the stepping rules based on whether a rule
is stepping over a protocol (c-ps:*), stepping over some state (c-ss:*), or is applicable on
both kinds of resource (c-rs:*). (c-rs:None) “spins” a configuration since a terminated
protocol cannot use the shared resources but must be stuck-free for consistency with our
definition. The following (c-rs:*Alternative) and (c-rs:*Intersection) rules “dissect”
a resource based on the alternative (⊕) or choice (&) presented. Each different alternative
state must be individually considered by a protocol, while only one alternative step of a
protocol needs to be valid. The situation is the reverse for choices: all choices of a protocol
must have a valid step, but a step of a protocol can choose which resource to consider when
stepping. State stepping, (c-ss:Step), transitions the step of the protocol and changes the
state of the shared resources to reflect the guaranteed state of the protocol. Ownership
recovery, (c-ss:Recovery), “consumes” the shared state (leaving it as none) which models
the transfer of ownership of that state back to the client context that uses the final step
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C 7→ C Composition, (c:*)
(c:Step)
〈 Γ ` RV RL[P ] 〉 7→ C0 RL[] =  || Q
〈 Γ ` RV RR[Q] 〉 7→ C1 RR[] = P || 
〈 Γ ` RV P || Q 〉 7→ C0 · C1
(c:AllStep)
C0 7→ C2
C1 7→ C3
C0 · C1 7→ C2 · C3
Composition — Reduction Step, (c-rs:*)
(c-rs:None)
〈 Γ ` RV R[none] 〉 7→ 〈 Γ ` RV R[none] 〉
(c-rs:StateIntersection)
〈 Γ ` R0 V R[P ] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` R0&R1 V R[P ] 〉 7→ C
(c-rs:ProtocolAlternative)
〈 Γ ` RV R[P0] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` RV R[P0 ⊕ P1] 〉 7→ C
(c-rs:ProtocolIntersection)
〈 Γ ` RV R[P0] 〉 7→ C0
〈 Γ ` RV R[P1] 〉 7→ C1
〈 Γ ` RV R[P0&P1] 〉 7→ C0 · C1
(c-rs:StateAlternative)
〈 Γ ` R0 V R[P ] 〉 7→ C0
〈 Γ ` R1 V R[P ] 〉 7→ C1
〈 Γ ` R0 ⊕R1 V R[P ] 〉 7→ C0 · C1
Composition — State Stepping, (c-ss:*)
(c-ss:Step)
〈 Γ ` S0 V R[S0 ⇒ S1;P ] 〉 7→ 〈 Γ ` S1 V R[P ] 〉
(c-ss:Recovery)
〈 Γ ` S V R[S] 〉 7→ 〈 Γ ` noneV R[none] 〉
Composition — Protocol Stepping, (c-ps:*)
(c-ps:Step)
〈 Γ ` S0 ⇒ S1;QV R[S0 ⇒ S1;P ] 〉 7→ 〈 Γ ` QV R[P ] 〉
Figure 6 Basic protocol composition stepping rules.
of the protocol. Protocol stepping, (c-ps:Step), requires an exact simulation of the rely
and guarantee types when stepping both the simulated protocol and the current stepping
protocol. Note that the rules above also enable the re-splitting of a protocol by extending
an ownership recovery step. In this situation, we have that the simulation of the original
protocol will seamlessly switch from the protocol stepping rules to the state stepping rules.
3 Polymorphic Protocol Composition
Up to this point, protocol composition does a strict stepping of protocols. Consequently,
stepping requires each protocol to know the exact type representation of the shared resources.
Ideally, to improve both locality and modularity, each protocol should only depend on the type
information that is relevant to the actions done through that alias. For instance, the action
done through the F protocol of page 6 does not need to know the precise type (Wait) that is
initially stored in location l. Thus, we want to be able to abstract Wait as X such that the
protocol only keeps the typing information that is relevant to that protocol’s local perspective
on the shared resources: ∃X.( rw l X ⇒ ( rw l Result#int ; none ) ). Similarly, the
wait step of the M protocol only depends on the tag of the shared cell enabling everything else to
be abstracted from its perspective: ∃X.( rw l Wait#X ⇒ ( rw l Wait#X ; M ) ) ⊕ (...).
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Since rely-guarantee protocols are first-class types, they can move outside the scope of a
“module”. Without this form of abstraction, such a move would either expose potentially
private information or limit how clients may later re-split the shared resources. While enabling
protocols to abstract part of their uses based on their perspective of the shared resources
improves modularity and increases flexibility, it also brings new challenges on defining safe
protocol composition and ensuring its termination. We will focus the discussion on two new
aliasing idioms that this kind of abstraction enables: a) existential-universal interaction, how
a universally quantified guarantee can safely interact with an existentially quantified rely;
and b) step extensions over abstractions, how abstractions enable existing protocol steps
to be re-split (i.e. nested protocol re-splitting) yet without the risk of introducing unsafe
interference on older protocols of that state. Section 4 approaches the decidability problem.
The remaining of this section starts by introducing the basic intuition of how protocol-level
abstraction works, before extending our definition of composition to account for abstraction.
3.1 Existential-Universal Interaction
Enabling existential abstraction over the contents of the shared state will naturally allow
a greater decoupling from the actions done by other aliases to that shared state. However,
since a protocol encodes sequences of steps, ensuring safety must also account for the validity
of the scope of the opaque type. For instance, consider the composition:
Γ ` rw p intV ∃X.( rw p X ⇒ rw p X ; rw p X ⇒ ... ) || ( rw p int ⇒ rw p boolean ; ... )
On the left protocol, the scope of X extends beyond a single (⇒) step. Because the right
protocol can change the underlying representation of X, this composition cannot be ruled
safe. Indeed, if X were of a pure type, the left protocol could potentially swap X’s to an X
of a different representation, in a way that would unsafely interfere with the right protocol’s
assumptions on the precise contents of the shared state. Thus, while the left protocol depends
on an opaque type, that protocol still requires that the scope/“lifetime” of X extends to the
next step although the protocol does not impose any other type restrictions on X.
We now discuss the core ideas that enable the safe composition of protocols that interact
over abstractions. First the interaction will only occur via the “lifetime” of the stored type
(as it changes on each step), and then we will use bounded quantification to enable types
that are less opaque. Consider the following protocols that are sharing a location p:
Nothing , ∃X.( rw p X ⇒ rw p X ; Nothing )
Full[Y ] , rw p Y ⇒ ∀Z.( rw p Z ; Full[Z] )
The Nothing protocol is defined using X to abstract the contents of the shared cell on a
single step, while also guaranteeing that X is restored before repeating the protocol. Thus,
Nothing cannot publicly modify the shared state, although p can undergo private changes.
Conversely, Full is able to arbitrarily modify the shared state by allowing its clients to
pick any type to apply to the ∀ of the guarantee. Full itself is parametric on the type
that is currently stored in the shared cell, Y . Each step of Full can exploit the precise
local information on how the state was modified, by remembering its own changes to cell
p. However, the “lifetime” of X in Nothing is restricted to a single step. Naturally, to be
able to check this composition in a finite number of steps, we must check the changes done
by Full abstractly. To illustrate how composition works in this case, consider the following
split where p initially holds a value of type int:
p : loc ` rw p int V Full[int] || Nothing
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Protocol composition results in the following set of configurations:
{Ê 〈 p : loc ` rw p intV Full[int] || Nothing 〉 ,
Ë 〈 p : loc, Z : type ` rw p Z V Full[Z] || Nothing 〉 }
The use of abstraction will mean that each configuration may have different assumptions
of type (and location) variables. Configuration Ê is the initial configuration given by the
split above, which includes the assumption that p is a known location. To step Nothing
from Ê, we must first find a representation type to open the existential. This type is found
by unifying the current state of the shared state (rw p int) with the rely type of Nothing
(rw p X). Thus, we see that X is abstracting int. After we open the existential, by exposing
the int type, we see that the step will preserve int resulting in Nothing yielding the same
Ê configuration. To step Ê with Full[int], we must consider that its resulting guarantee
is abstract. The new configuration, Ë, must consider a fresh type variable to represent
that new type that a client can pick. In this case, we used Z to represent that new type.
It is straightforward to see that if we were to step Nothing from Ë we would remain in
configuration Ë following similar reasoning to that done for Ê. Perhaps the surprising aspect
is that further steps with Full will also yield configurations that are equivalent to Ë.
The typing environment plays a crucial role in enabling us to close the proof of safe
composition. Although each step of Full must consider a fresh type due to the ∀, stepping
results in configurations that are equivalent up to renaming of variables and weakening of Γ.
Weakening allows us to ignore variables that no longer occur free in a configuration. This
means that further steps with Full result in configurations that are equivalent to already
seen configurations. Thus, although the set of different types that can be applied to Full’s
guarantee is infinite, the number of distinct interactions that can legally occur through that
shared state is finite if we model those interactions abstractly. Lifetime conflicts cannot occur
with this technique as even if we open an existential, we must still step the new configuration.
Consequently, the problematic composition above would be detected via stepping.
We can use bounded quantification to provide more expressive abstractions that go
beyond the fully opaque types used above (which are equivalent to a “<: top” bound), and
convert this example into one of more practical use. By using appropriate bounds, we can
give concrete roles to the Nothing and Full protocols. Consider that we want to share
access to some data structure among several different threads. However, depending on how
these threads dynamically use that data structure, it may become important to switch its
representation (such as change from a linked list to a binary tree, etc.). Furthermore, we
want one specialized thread (the Controller) to retain precise control over the data structure
and to be allowed to monitor and change its representation. Concurrently, an arbitrary
number of other threads (the Workers) also have access to the data structure but are limited
to only access its Basic operations.
W , ∃X <: B.( rw p X ⇒ rw p X ; W )
C[Y ] , rw p Y ⇒ ∀Z <: B.( rw p Z ; C[Z] )
As before W is committed to preserve the representation type of X although it now has
sufficient room to use that type as B. C is now more constrained than before since it is forced
to guarantee a type that is compatible with B. However, C retains the possibility of both
changing the representation type contained in the shared state, and also of “remembering”
the precise (representation) type that was the result of its own local action. Finally, note
that we can safely re-split W arbitrarily (i.e. W V W || W). Protocol composition yields
similar set of configurations, but with the bound assumption on Z. This form of asymmetric
interaction over shared state relates to the full− pure interaction of access permissions [3].
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A full permission allows exclusive write permission to an object, but also enables read-only
permissions (pure) to co-exists. Consequently, each pure permission must assume that
other permissions can modify the shared object up to a certain type, the state guarantee.
While their work focuses on the read-write distinction, and our work is centered on modeling
type-changing mutations (so all aliases can write), the example shows that we are able to
naturally model similar asymmetric interaction within our protocol framework.
3.2 Inner Step Extension with Specialization
Re-splitting an existing protocol while specializing its interference is possible, provided that
its effects remain consistent with those of the original protocol. Namely we can append new
steps to an otherwise ownership recovery step, or produce effects that are more precise than
those of the original protocol. The first case allows us to connect two protocols together by
that recovery step. The latter case is more interesting: when combined with abstraction it
allows specialization within an existing step (i.e. nested re-splits), enabling new forms of
shared state interactions through that abstraction.
To illustrate the expressiveness gains, we revisit the join protocol of Section 2. However,
instead of spawning a single thread to compute the work, we re-split the join protocol in
two symmetric workers that share the workload. The last of the workers to complete merges
the two results together and “signals” the waiting main thread. First, we rewrite the two
protocols to enable abstraction on the M protocol, and add a choice (&) to the F protocol
that enables F to use the state more than once until it provides a result.
F[X] , ( rw p W#X ⇒ ∀Y.( rw p W#Y ; F[Y ] ) ) & ( rw p W#X ⇒ rw p R#int ; none )
M , ∃Z.( rw p W#Z ⇒ rw p W#Z ; M ) ⊕ ( rw p R#int⇒ rw p int ; rw p int )
As before, M will Wait until there is a Result in p. At that point, M will recover ownership of
that cell. Unlike before, M no longer depends on the value tagged as W since it is abstracted
as Z. The F protocol now holds two choices (&): the old step that transitions from Wait
to Result, and a new step that changes the representation of the value tagged as W and
used during the wait phase. The F protocol of Section 2 is a specialization of this protocol
since it includes only one of the choices. In here, we specialize F into two symmetric worKer
protocols. To simplify the presentation, we assume that the worker thread will receive the
work parameters through some other mean (such as a pure value shared among threads).
Once a worker finishes its job, it will push the resulting int to the shared state. If it notices
it is the last worker to finish, it will merge the two results together and flag the state as
ready, so that Main can proceed.
K , ( rw p W#(E#[])⇒ rw p W#(R#int) ; none ) ⊕ ( rw p W#(R#int)⇒ rw p R#int ; none )
It is important to note that the new tags/values are nested inside the old W tag. This ensures
that the new usages remain hidden from M and “look” just like the previous F usage. (There
are also no lifetime conflicts since M does not preserve its type assumption on the abstraction
beyond a single step.) However, these inner tags are used by the two workers for coordination:
the W#Empty tag means that neither thread has finished, and W#Result means that one of
the threads has already finished. We can then re-split F as follows (note the required initial
type in F, E#[], for this split to be valid): Γ ` F[E#[]] V K || K. Protocol composition
follows analogous principles to above, except that we are now simulating the steps of the
original F protocol with the steps of the two new K protocols:
{ 〈 Γ ` F[E#[]] V K || K 〉 , 〈 Γ ` F[R#int] V K || none 〉 ,
〈 Γ ` F[R#int] V none || K 〉 , 〈 Γ ` none V none || none 〉 }
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(c-rs:Weakening)
〈 Γ0 ` RV R[P ] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ0,Γ1 ` RV R[P ] 〉 7→ C
(c-ss:ForallLoc)
〈 Γ, l : loc ` S V R[S ⇒ P ] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` S V R[S ⇒ ∀l.P ] 〉 7→ C
(c-ss:OpenLoc)
〈 Γ ` S V R[P{p/l}] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` S V R[∃l.P ] 〉 7→ C
(c-ss:ForallType)
〈 Γ, X : type, X <: A ` S V R[S ⇒ P ] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` S V R[S ⇒ ∀X <: A.P ] 〉 7→ C
(c-ss:OpenType)
Γ ` A1 <: A0 〈 Γ ` S V R[P{A1/X}] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` S V R[∃X <: A0.P ] 〉 7→ C
(c-ps:ExistsType)
〈 Γ, X : type, X <: A ` P V R[Q] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` ∃X <: A.P V R[∃X <: A.Q] 〉 7→ C
(c-ps:ExistsLoc)
〈 Γ, l : loc ` P V R[Q] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` ∃l.P V R[∃l.Q] 〉 7→ C
(c-ps:ForallType)
〈 Γ, X : type, X <: A ` S ⇒ P V R[S ⇒ Q] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` S ⇒ ∀X <: A.P V R[S ⇒ ∀X <: A.Q] 〉 7→ C
(c-ps:ForallLoc)
〈 Γ, l : loc ` S ⇒ P V R[S ⇒ Q] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` S ⇒ ∀l.P V R[S ⇒ ∀l.Q] 〉 7→ C
(c-ps:LocApp)
〈 Γ ` S ⇒ P{p/l}V R[S ⇒ Q] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` S ⇒ ∀l.P V R[S ⇒ Q] 〉 7→ C
(c-ps:TypeApp)
Γ ` A1 <: A0 〈 Γ ` S ⇒ P{A1/X}V R[S ⇒ Q] 〉 7→ C
〈 Γ ` S ⇒ ∀X <: A0.P V R[S ⇒ Q] 〉 7→ C
P{A/X} , “substitution, in P , of X for A”
Note: bound type/location variables of a type must be fresh in that rule’s conclusion.
Figure 7 Protocol composition abstraction extension.
Each simulation will match the rely and guarantee types of a step in F with a step in K, even
if specializing a ∀ of F to a specific type in K. As before, K can choose which step to simulate
when given a choice (&) of F steps. Similarly, at least one alternative (⊕) of K must match
a step in F. Therefore, the new K protocols work within the interference of the original F
protocol, but specialize its uses of the shared state.
3.3 Composing Abstract Protocols
The composition rules of Figure 7 complement those of Figure 6 to enable composing abstract
protocols. Weakening on a configuration (up to renaming), (c-rs:Weakening), is the crucial
mechanism that enables us to close the co-inductive proof when using quantifiers. Thus,
when we reach a configuration that is equivalent up to renaming of variables and weakening
of Γ, we can close the proof. The (c-ss:Forall*) rules do similar stepping to (c-ss:Step)
but considering an abstracted guarantee, which results in a typing environment with the
opened abstraction. (c-ss:Open*) exposes the representation type/location (if it exists)
before doing a regular step. (c-ps:Forall*) and (c-ps:Exists*) open their respective
abstraction before doing a regular simulation step. More interestingly, (c-ps:*App) enables
a simulated step to pick a particular type/location to apply before that regular simulation
stepping, enabling step specialization during simulation. In the T.R, we also consider a
straightforward extension to protocol composition that enables subtyping over stepping.
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1 let newMVar = λ _.
2 let m = new Empty#{} in
3 // splits the new cell using single MVar protocol
4 Γ ` (rw l Empty#[]) V MVar[l] || none
5 {
6 putMVar = λ val. rec R.
7 lock m;
8 case !m of
9 Empty#x → m := Full#val;
10 unlock m
11 | Full#value → m := Full#value;
12 unlock m;
13 R // retries
14 end
15 end,
16 splitMVar = λ _.
17 Γ ` MVar[l]V MVar[l] || MVar[l]
18 {},
19 takeMVar = λ _. rec R.
20 lock m;
21 case !m of
22 Empty#x → m := Empty#x;
23 unlock m;
24 R // retries
25 | Full#value → m := Empty#{};
26 unlock m;
27 value
28 end
29 end
Figure 8 MVar example.
3.4 Discussion & Brief Examples
Above, we showed how our local, isolated protocol types can model core interference concepts
over a relatively small and simple calculus. We refrained from adding support for more
precise states and refined data abstractions of others (such as [15]), and focus instead on
typestates [20, 30, 29]. However, this is not an intrinsic limitation of our model. If we
consider more precise states, we can (for instance) model monotonic counters from prior
work [25, 11] where each counter shares state symmetrically. Our local protocols model these
uses solely from the perspective of a single alias as:
MC , ∃ {j : int}︸ ︷︷ ︸
J
.( rw p j︸︷︷︸
J
⇒ ∀ {i : int | i ≥ j}︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
.( rw p i︸︷︷︸
I
; MC ) )
The protocol models a monotonically increasing counter on location p. The step relies
on location p initially containing some integer, j, and modifying the cell to store some
other value, i, that is greater or equal than j. This interaction can be reduced to the core
existential-universal protocol interaction discussed above (but, in our calculus, using less
precise types: J and I) and where the protocol can be re-split indefinitely.
While our states are less precise, we can enforce more precise uses of that shared state.
The semantics of prior work [25, 11] differ on whether the counter is forcefully used by clients,
or whether the action was simply available to be used. We can model the two cases explicitly:
∃p.( (!ref p) :: MC ( [] :: MC ), which enables clients to use the counter an arbitrary number
of times or simply thread it through, unused. While in:
∀X.∃p.( (!ref p) :: ∃J.( rw p J ⇒ ∀I.( rw p I ; X ) ) ( [] :: X )
by unfolding the protocol, the function guarantees that a single step of the protocol will be
used. Since we (intentionally) abstract subsequent steps, the function cannot use the counter
beyond that single use. Analogous reasoning can be used to enforce specific, finite, usages.
Adding support for dependent refinement types, and ensuring its decidability (even
without interference), is beyond the scope of our work as we focus on the core composition
problem. However, we believe that the underlying decidability insights made here will carry
to a system with decidable dependent refinement types; even if perhaps requiring more
fine-grained conditions to close the co-inductive proof of safe interference—that are only
relevant once more precise typing is considered.
While we use a relatively simple calculus to keep the theory focused on the core of
interference-control, we can for instance model MVars [24]. Figure 8 shows an MVar, a
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let x = new 0 in
// share ’x’ via protocols
{
lockMe = λ_.lock x,
// ...
}
Figure 9 Indirect locking.
lock @a; Γ = a : ref @a
let b = !a;
// locks location of ’b’
lock @b;
unlock @a;
let c = !b;
lock @c;
unlock @b;
...
Figure 10 Hand-over-hand locking example.
structure that contains a single shared cell which is either empty or contains a value of some
type. Notable operations include: putMVar, that waits until the cell is empty before inserting
the given value; and takeMVar which waits until the cell is full to remove the cell’s value,
leaving the cell empty. MVars can be shared by many aliases using the protocol:
MVar[m] , ∃Y.( ( (rw m Empty#Y )⇒ (rw m Empty#Y ) ; MVar[m] ) &
( (rw m Empty#Y )⇒ (rw m Full#int) ; MVar[m] ) )
⊕ ( ( (rw m Full#int)⇒ (rw m Empty#[]) ; MVar[m] ) &
∃Y.( (rw m Full#Y )⇒ (rw m Full#Y ) ; MVar[m] ) )
The T.R. [21] includes additional examples, including modeling examples of prior work
with our more local protocol types. We can also model a shared pair where each alias keeps
its own, local, precise knowledge on one of the two components of the pair stored in that
shared state. The two aliases, L and R, share a common cell but keep part of that state
private to itself. While both can do private actions over the shared cell, they are guaranteed
to not interfere with the precise assumptions of the remaining alias.
P[A][B] , rw p [A,B]
L[A] , ∃X.( P[A][X]⇒ ∀Y.( P[Y ][X] ; L[Y ] ) )
R[A] , ∃X.( P[X][A]⇒ ∀Y.( P[X][Y ] ; R[Y ] ) )
Γ ` P[X][Y ] V L[X] || R[Y ]
Thus, we can use the different perspectives of each protocol to model local knowledge that is
hidden from other aliases, within our core protocol framework.
Since our types express sharing, we can use standard techniques to abstract the com-
ponents of a protocol type after safe composition is checked. This enables an abstraction
to expose a type interface that indirectly manipulates the shared state, such as indirectly
locking/unlocking state (Figure 9). We can type the record in such a way to hide the type
in x but still expose some information on sharing that is useful for later enabling other
typestate functions [20]. For instance: ∃A.∃B.∃C.[ ..., lockMe : [] :: (A ⇒ B;C) ( [] ::
(A ∗ (B;C)), add : ( int :: A ( [] :: A ), ... ]. Clients can only call add once the type A
is available. This could model, for instance, a global lock on a collection to enable more
coarse-grained control over the interference to that collection—but without exposing the lock
to clients. Thus, when lockMe returns, the client receives a type that expresses that A is
available and that a guarantee (B;C) is expected to be fulfilled. However, this fulfillment can
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only occur indirectly via the wrapper record as clients do not have a direct way of accessing
or mutating the internals of that shared state.
While we do not guarantee dead-lock freedom, it is possible to type more fine-grained
locking schemes such as hand-over-hand locking (Figure 10). Consider the protocol of a list’s
node:
L[q] , ∃l.( (rw q !ref l) ∗ L[l] ⇒ (rw q !ref l) ; ... )
L is defined over a location q that contains the (abstracted) reference to the next element of
the sequence of locations to be locked. Locking will enable access to that ref l which can
then be locked to gain access to L[l], the next element in the sequence of locations to lock.
For brevity, we make each step simply consume L, instead of (for instance) re-splitting.
4 Composition Decidability & Other Technical Results
We now show decidability of protocol composition and discuss the remaining technical results
of our language. The decidability statement comes as a direct consequence of ensuring a
regular type structure via syntactic well-formedness constraints on recursive types. Although
applied in the context of protocol composition, we follow ideas from prior work on ensuring
decidable subtyping over bounded quantification [28, 4]. The main novelty is in extending
this kind of reasoning to account for recursive types with parameters, in order to ensure
a regular type structure over our more flexible recursive types. To achieve this, we apply
well-formedness conditions which ensure that there is only a finite number of reachable
(abstract) protocol states. We focus the discussion on decidability of protocol composition,
and point interested readers to T.R. where these conditions are properly motivated and
discussed. Crucially, these well-formedness conditions enable us to state the following:
I Lemma 1 (Finite Uses). Given a well-formed recursive type (rec X(u).A)[U ] the number
of possible uses of X in A such that Γ ` X[U ′] type is bounded.
I Lemma 2 (Finite Unfolds). Unfolding a well-formed recursive type (rec X(u).A)[U ] produces
a finite set of variants of that original recursive type that (at most) contains: permutations
of U , or a set of mixtures of U with some type/location variables representing a class of
equivalent (≡) types.
I Lemma 3 (Finite Sub-Terms). Given a well-formed type A, such that Γ ` A type, the set
of sub-terms of A is finite up to renaming of variables and weakening of Γ.
4.1 Composition Properties, Algorithm, and Decidability
Informally, correctness of protocol composition is based on the two properties: 1) a split results
in protocols that can always take a step with the current state of the shared resources, thus
are never stuck; and, 2) protocol composition is a partial commutative monoid (associative,
commutative, and with none as the identity element). Because of property 2), iterative
splittings of existing protocols remain struck-free, unable to cause unsafe interference. We
now state these properties formally but leave the proofs to the T.R.. The next two lemmas
show stuck freedom by properties that resemble progress and preservation but over protocols:
I Lemma 4. If Γ ` RV P || Q then 〈 Γ ` RV P || Q 〉 7→ C.
Meaning that if two protocols, P and Q, compose safely then their configuration can take a
step to another set of configurations, C.
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I Lemma 5. If 〈 Γ ` RV P || Q 〉 7→ 〈 Γ′ ` R′ V P ′ || Q′ 〉 · C and Γ ` RV P || Q then
Γ′ ` R′ V P ′ || Q′.
The lemma ensures that if two protocols compose safely, then any of the next configurations
that result from stepping will also be safe. Note that protocol composition does not enforce
that the shared resources are not lost. Instead our concern is on safe interference. Indeed,
resources that are never used will never be able to unsafely interfere. To avoid losing resources,
we must forbid the use of (c-rs:None) on non-terminated protocols and that both P and Q
cannot have both simultaneously terminated if there are non-none resources left. Once that
restriction is considered, our splitting induces a monoid in the sense that for any P and Q
for which Γ ` RV P || Q is defined there is a single such R (defined up to subtyping and
equivalent protocol/state interference specification). Since for any two protocols there may
not always exist an R that can be split into P and Q, this is a partial monoid.
I Lemma 6. Protocol composition obeys the following properties:
1. (identity) Γ ` RV R || none.
2. (commutativity) If Γ ` RV P0 || P1 then Γ ` RV P1 || P0.
3. (associativity) If we have Γ ` RV P0 || P and Γ ` P V P1 || P2 then exists Q such that
Γ ` RV Q || P2 and Γ ` QV P0 || P1.
(i.e. If Γ ` RV P0 || (P1 || P2) then Γ ` RV (P0 || P1) || P2 )
Protocol composition is defined as a “split”, left-to-right (V). Simply reading the rules as
right-to-left (W) to compute a “merge” is not safe. For instance, it would enable merging to
arbitrary choices with (c-rs:StateIntersection). Intuitively, merging needs to intertwine
the uses of both protocols. However, since we do not track copies (as we target sharing when
that tracking is not possible), merging cannot “collapse” a protocol into a non-protocol type.
In this case “merging” is equivalent to simply having the two non-merged protocols available
in ∆ or bundled using the ∗ type.
The composition algorithm is shown in the T.R. and is a straightforward implementation
of the axiomatic definitions shown above. The algorithm uses a set of visited configurations
to remember past configurations and ensure that once all different protocol configurations
are exhausted (up to renaming and weakening of Γ), the algorithm can terminate. We now
state our technical lemmas on the composition algorithm but leave the proofs to the T.R..
I Lemma 7. Given well-formed types and environment, we have that:
1. (soundness) if c( Γ, R, P, Q ) then Γ ` RV P || Q.
2. (completeness) if Γ ` RV P || Q then c( Γ, R, P, Q ).
3. (decidability) c( Γ, R, P, Q ) terminates.
4.2 Correctness Properties
Progress and preservation theorems are defined over valid program configurations such that:
Γ | ∆i ` ei : ![] a · i ∈ {0, ..., n} n ≥ 0
Γ | ∆0, ..., ∆n ` e0 · ... · en
(wf:Program)
Stating that a thread pool (e0 · ... · en) is well formed if each thread can be assigned
a “piece” of the linear typing environment (containing resources), and if each individual
expression has type ![] without leaving any residual resources (·). Note that the conditions
on each thread (ei) are identical to those imposed by (t:Fork). For clarity, both safety
theorems are supported by auxiliary theorems over a single expression, besides the main
theorem over the complete thread pool. We now state progress over programs:
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I Theorem 8. If Γ | ∆ ` T0 and live(T0) and if exists H0 such that Γ | ∆ ` H0 then
H0 ; T0 7→ H1 ; T1.
live(T ) means that the thread pool T contains at least one “live” thread such that the
thread is neither a value nor is waiting for a lock to be released (which includes deadlocks).
Γ | ∆ ` H ensures that the Heap is well-defined according to Γ and ∆.
We define Wait(H, e) over a thread e and heap H such that the Evaluation context is
reduced to evaluating the configuration: H ; E [lock ρ, ρ′] · T where ρ ↪→ v /∈ H
which contains at least one location (ρ) that is currently locked or was deleted and, therefore,
the thread must block waiting (potentially indefinitely) for that lock to be available before
continuing. “Early” deletion of shared resources results in a pending guarantee. Since
well-formed threads cannot leave residual resources, this situation is ruled out for correct
programs, but may occur on the theorem below. Progress over expressions is defined as:
I Theorem 9. If Γ | ∆0 ` e0 : A a ∆1 then we have that either:
e0 is a value, or;
if exists H0 and ∆ such that Γ | ∆,∆0 ` H0 then either:
(steps) H0 ; e0 7→ H1 ; e1 · T , or;
(waits) Wait(H0, e0).
Preservation ensures that a reduction step will preserve both the type and the effects of
the expression that is being reduced (so that each thread’s type, ![], and effect, ·, remains
unchanged). As above, we use a preservation theorem over programs that makes use of an
auxiliary theorem on preservation over expressions:
I Theorem 10. If we have Γ0 | ∆0 ` H0 and Γ0 | ∆0 ` T0 and H0 ; T0 7→ H1 ; T1 then,
for some ∆1 and Γ1, we have: Γ0,Γ1 | ∆1 ` H1 and Γ0,Γ1 | ∆1 ` T1.
So that a well-formed pool of threads (T0) remains well-formed after stepping one of these
threads (resulting in T1). Preservation over a single expression must still account for the
resources (∆T ) that may be consumed by a newly spawned thread (T ):
I Theorem 11. If we have H0 ; e0 7→ H1 ; e1 · T and Γ0 | ∆0,∆T ,∆2 ` H0 and
Γ0 | ∆0,∆T ` e0 : A a ∆ then, for some ∆1 and Γ1, we have: Γ0,Γ1 | ∆1,∆T ,∆2 ` H1 and
Γ0,Γ1 | ∆1 ` e1 : A a ∆ and Γ0,Γ1 | ∆T ` T .
The following “Error Freedom” corollary complements the main results to show that our
system cannot type programs that allow data races and the dereference of destroyed memory
cells, i.e. that our system ensures memory safety and race freedom.
I Corollary 12. The following program states cannot be typed:
1. (Data Race) H; E0[ρ := v] · E1[!ρ] · T H; E0[ρ := v] · E1[ρ := v′] · T
2. (Memory Fault) H; E [ρ := v] · T H; E [!ρ] · T (where ρ /∈ H)
3. (Ownership Fault) H; E [delete ρ] · T (where ρ /∈ H)
The proof is straightforward due to our use of locks to ensure mutual exclusion and the
fact that our protocols discipline the use of shared state. Thus, these errors are ruled out by
either protocol composition or by the resource tracking of the core linear system.
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receive(c) , rec R.
lock c;
case !c of
// 1. waiting states (A..Z)
A#n → ... // analogous to below
| Z#n → // restore linear content
c := Z#n;
unlock c; R // retry
// 2. desired (receive) state
| ReadyToReceive#v →
c := Idle#{}; // "received"
unlock c;
v // value received from "channel"
end
end
send(c,v) , rec R.
lock c;
case !c of
// 1. waiting states (A..Z)
A#n → ... // analogous to below
| Z#n → // restore linear content
c := Z#n;
unlock c; R // retry
// 2. desired (idle) state
| Idle#_ →
c := ReadyToReceive#v; // "sent"
unlock c;
{} // result of send is empty
end
end
Figure 11 Simple encoding of send and receive functions via a shared cell.
let c = connectSeller() in
c : buy!(prod) ; price?(p) ; details?(d)
send(c, GET_USER_PRODUCT() );
let price = receive(c) in
let details = receive(c) in
close(c)
end
end
Figure 12 Buyer code.
5 Protocol Expressiveness
We show the expressiveness of our protocols by modeling typeful message-passing concur-
rency, using a straightforward encoding of message-passing via shared memory interference
(Figure 11). The encoding itself should be unsurprising as it follows well-known ideas from
the literature, so we defer less important details to the T.R. to focus instead on the most
interesting aspect of this example: how our protocol framework is able to type such uses and
ensure their safety.
We encode a more primitive, “low-level” view of typeful message-passing concurrency via
the causality of shared memory interference. We focus on the non-distributed setting where
a channel can be precisely encoded as a low-level shared cell. Channel communication and
its changing session properties are emulated indirectly via inspection of or interference over
the contents of that shared cell. Thus, our functions to send/receive a value simply hide the
underlying Waiting states, for instance to receive:
Wait[A0..An] ⊕ ( rw c ReadyToReceive#V ⇒ rw c Idle#[] ; NextStep )
where Wait is a sequence of retry steps that leave the state unmodified, until a value of type
V is “received”. Sending uses a similar protocol but where we must wait for an Idle cell
before “sending”. The T.R. includes the complete “Buyer-Seller-Shipper” example (the
canonical and simple example used in session-based concurrency works) while in here we
only take a look at the main aspects of the Buyer’s interaction with the channel (Figure 12).
We model a channel using a capability to location c. For brevity, we omit “rw c” from
“rw c A” since all changes occur over that same location. The Buyer’s type uses standard
pi-calculus [22] notations where ! sends and ? receives a value. These actions are mapped to
the rely type (receive) and the guarantee type (send).
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buy!(prod)︸ ︷︷ ︸
idle0#[]⇒ buy#prod
; price?(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
price#p⇒ idle2#[]
; details?(d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
details#d⇒ []
Buyer starts by sending a request to buy some product, then waits for the price, and finally
receives the details of that product. Under that interaction protocol, we simply map sends
to a guarantee type of a step, and receives to a rely type of a step.
Our protocol interactions are both non-deterministic and may contain an arbitrary number
of simultaneous participants. To ensure that the desired participant (Buyer) is the only one
allowed to received (take) the price, we must mark the contents with a specific tag so that
only Buyer has permission to change that state. To handle the non-deterministic interleaving
of protocols, we must introduce explicit “wait states” that allow a participant to check if
the communication has reached the desired point to that participant or if it should continue
waiting. We abstract these steps as Wait as they simply recur on that same step:
idle0#[]⇒ buy#prod ; Wait ⊕ ( price#p⇒ idle2#[] ) ; Wait ⊕ ( details#d⇒ [] )
The richness of our shared state interactions means that we can immediately support
fairly complex session-based mechanisms (such as delegation, asynchronous communication,
“messages to self”, multiparty interactions, internal/external choices, etc.) within our small
protocol framework. However, this flexibility comes at the cost of requiring a more complex
composition mechanism. Protocol composition accounts for both non-deterministic protocol
interleaving and “multi-way” communication, features which are usually absent from strictly
choreographed session-based concurrency (favoring instead strong liveness properties over
more deterministic, linear compositions). Naturally, more complex examples are possible. In
here our focus is on showing the core insights that enable us to relate the two techniques:
1) mapping receive/send to our rely/guarantee types; 2) adding explicit waiting states to
account for non-deterministic protocol interleaving; and 3) tag the content of a cell in order
to ensure that only the right participant will be able to mutate the state at that point in the
interaction. (Recall that we do not guarantee deadlock freedom, nor termination.)
6 Related Work
This work is based on results collected in Militão’s PhD thesis [18]. Our work relates to
prior work on rely-guarantee protocols [19]. We show that these protocols are useful to
reason about concurrency and significantly improve the flexibility of protocol composition.
Namely, we allow the composition of abstract protocols (enabling more local typing), show
that our composition is decidable, and provide a novel axiomatic definition of composition
that is straightforward to implement. Since thread-based interference is rooted in alias-
related interference, the technique itself is mostly indifferent to whether sharing occurs in the
sequential or concurrent setting. Still, we address all technicalities that make concurrency
possible, such as adding support for threads and locking of locations; which then enables us
to express typeful message-passing concurrency in our protocols.
Our work is also related to recent work on more precise tracking of interference. Chal-
ice [17] uses a simplified form of rely-guarantee to reason about shared state interference by
constraining a thread’s changes to a two-state invariant, relating the previous and current
states. Monotonic [8, 25] uses of shared state (where all changes converge to more precise
states) are less dependent on aliasing information, which simplifies checking at the expense
of expressiveness. Dynamic ownership recovery mechanisms [33, 26] choose some run-time
overhead and dynamic safety guarantees to enable more flexible ownership recovery than
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purely static approaches. Rely-guarantee references [11] adapt the use of rely-guarantee
to individual reference cells with support for dependent refinement types in a sequential
language. Although the use of refinements adds expressiveness to the description of sharing,
they do not support ownership recovery, nor address decidability, and typechecking can
require manual assistance in Coq. Access permissions [33, 3, 2] control alias interference by
categorizing read-write uses into different permission kinds. Our design omits the read-write
distinction to focus exclusively on structuring alias interference using more fundamental
protocol primitives. Interestingly, although we only model write-exclusive uses, our types
can enforce effectively read-exclusive semantics by ensuring that any private change in a cell
will be reverted to its original public value. However, this simpler form of read-only cannot
capture their multiple, simultaneous readers case. Still, by modeling interference in a more
fundamental way, we gain additional expressiveness beyond their most permissive share
permission as we can model uses beyond invariant-based sharing. In [5] Crafa and Pavodani
introduce a high-level (actor-like) model for sharing (type)state via join patterns. We target
a more low-level programming paradigm (which builds typestates through type abstraction
rather than as a first-class language feature), enabling us to introduce abstraction at the level
of protocols and support protocol re-splitting in ways that are not expressible in their work.
Several recent works use partial commutative monoids [7, 16, 6] to model sharing by
leveraging the concept of fictional separation [7, 12]. Commutative monoids offer the
underlying general principle for splitting resources, enabling seemingly unrelated components
to interact via aliasing under a layer of (fictional) separation. We compare more closely to
[16] due to our common use of L3 [1] and type-based approach. In [16], Krishnaswami et
al. define a generic sharing rule based on programmer-supplied commutative monoids for
safe sharing of state in a single-threaded environment. Their work does not approach the
issue of decidability of resource splitting, and requires wrapping access to shared state in an
module abstraction that serves as an intermediary to sharing. Our work focuses on a custom
commutative monoid that enables first-class sharing without (necessarily) needing a wrapping
module abstraction. Although our protocol splitting is a specialized monoid, we showed
that this mechanism is relatively flexible, decidable, and give an algorithmic implementation.
Other technical differences between our works abound such as their use of affine refinement
types (enabling more fine-grained types), our use of multi-threaded semantics and allowing
inconsistent states (i.e. locked cells) to be moved around as first-class, etc.
Protocol-based mechanisms for safe interference are also used by other approaches, such as
in program logic-based systems (e.g. [14, 31, 32, 23, 9]). By generally targeting manual proofs
(and somewhat more involved specifications) these works generally fit into a different design
space than ours, although share some interesting similarities. While we make concessions
on expressiveness to achieve decidable protocol composition and re-splitting, these works
focus instead on the expressiveness of their concurrency specification. LRG [9] supports
lock-free structures but requires a special frame-rule to support framing over rely-guarantee
conditions. We simply integrate protocols into the language (as linear resources) meaning
that the standard frame-rule suffices. Supporting lock-free concurrency in our system would
require reinterpreting a ⇒ step as a single-cell atomic conditional operation; with the shared
resource (stored in the cell) being immediately extracted/inserted from/into the cell, rather
than just accessible after locking. CaReSL [32] and Iris [14] support “islands”/regions of
memory that are shared together and whose imprecise state must be considered on use. Our
composition rules enforce that a protocol carries all information on imprecise states, which
is then deconstructed via (t:Alternative-Left) and case analysis. Our protocols can
group shared state using the ∗ operator to define shallow “regions”, while their works allow
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for richer specifications of atomic regions of any depth. Iris [14] further supports a form
of re-splitting via a “view shifting” mechanism, to repartition (or create) shared regions.
FCSL [23] encodes protocols via auxiliary/ghost state. Although done in a compositional
way, it can require checking for safe interference (“stability”) after a split since a safe split
does not necessarily imply safe interference in all situations. Our composition mechanism
is essentially a form of checking for safe interference early, at the moment of the split, by
checking that all possible future uses are safe (like a form of “pre-computed” stability check).
Protocol composition itself can also be seen as a form of model checking (to check that
each state has a successor) that uses abstract states to ensure a finite state space, but in a
system that is more intimately integrated with the language. Our protocols are first-class
resources that can be specialized by clients, even abstracting (leaving out) later steps. Thus,
our protocols guide the programmer on how to reason locally about (safe) interference by
mapping its uses of locks to a local protocol type that models the alias perspective on the
shared state. While our work focuses on modeling the core interference phenomenon within a
small calculus, rather than precisely typing existing programs, we still showed that extensions
may be used to model at least some existing programs within our model.
7 Conclusions
We defined a flexible and decidable procedure that ensures the safe composition of interfering
abstract protocols that share access to mutable state. While employing a relatively small
protocol framework, we are able to model the core interference principles of complex shared
state interactions within our core calculus. Finally, we showed the expressiveness of our
protocol framework by discussing how it can also model typeful message-passing concurrency.
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